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Cybercrime continues to impose substantial operational and financial burdens on organizations across public and private sectors. In 2023, reported losses due to cybercrime in the United States exceeded $12.5 billion1, highlighting the scale and persistence of malicious activity. Within this landscape, Security Operations Centers (SOCs) serve as the primary operational units responsible for detecting, analyzing, and responding to threats in real time.
Detection logic in many SOC workflows is implemented through rule-based mechanisms within Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platforms, which are widely used because they are interpretable, deterministic, and compatible with existing SOC workflows. Among the different rule types, correlation-based SIEM rules are especially important for identifying attack behaviors that span multiple events, hosts, and time windows. Within these rules, regular expressions (regexes) function as a reusable search primitive: analysts embed them within broader detection rules that add field constraints, platform-specific filters, and event-correlation logic, rather than deploying them as self-contained detectors.
In practice, SOC analysts often begin rule development with indicators of compromise (IOCs) derived from cyber threat intelligence (CTI) reports published by security vendors, independent researchers, or public knowledge bases such as MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)2. These IOC strings may include file paths, command-line fragments, registry keys, or other structured artifacts observed during attacks3. Translating such strings into regex patterns suitable for SIEM correlation rules is a recurring task in the rule-authoring workflow.
This translation step is a practical operational bottleneck. Authoring regex patterns that are general enough to capture meaningful variation but precise enough to avoid unintended matches require specialized expertise; small syntactic errors or incorrect decisions about which components to preserve or generalize can render an otherwise useful detection rule ineffective. Because this work is manual, repetitive, and detail-oriented, it may delay detection deployment for emerging threats, require review by more experienced analysts, and contribute to analyst workload in operational SOC settings4,5.
The central challenge in IOC-to-regex translation is deciding which parts of an IOC encode stable, attacker-relevant behavior and should therefore be preserved, and which parts reflect environment- or host-specific variation and should be generalized. For example, canonical registry roots such as HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID, system directories such as System32, and known executable names such as rundll32.exe typically need to remain explicit, whereas user profile paths, host-specific Security Identifiers (SIDs), and Globally Unique Identifiers (GUIDs) should ordinarily be abstracted. Doing this consistently across heterogeneous IOC types is what makes the translation task non-trivial. Throughout this protocol, we refer to the former as preserved or capture-group components, and the latter as abstract or non-capture-group components.
Prior work has explored automated extraction of threat intelligence from unstructured text using natural language processing and entity-extraction techniques6,7. More recently, several studies have investigated direct generation of detection rules from CTI reports using large language models (LLMs)8. These approaches demonstrate that parts of the rule-authoring workflow can be assisted by language models, but they do not typically focus on the specific operational problem of generating regex patterns that preserve capture-group semantics and remain suitable for downstream SIEM deployment. Complementary lines of work have structured CTI content for downstream use in different ways, including knowledge-graph-based representations such as TINKER9 and CTI-driven generation of log-hunting queries such as ThreatRaptor10, which convert unstructured CTI into structured knowledge or domain-specific query languages rather than into regex patterns intended for embedding in SIEM correlation rules.
In parallel, prior studies have explored automated regex synthesis using example-based methods, neural translation, and generate-and-repair approaches11,12,13,14,15,16. However, those methods are generally designed for settings that rely on large sets of representative examples or natural-language descriptions rather than IOC-driven detection contexts. In SOC workflows, IOC strings are often sparse, structurally heterogeneous, and closely tied to operational semantics. This mismatch motivates a workflow tailored to IOC-to-regex translation rather than a claim that existing regex-generation methods are broadly inadequate.
The protocol presented here focuses specifically on the IOC-to-regex translation stage of the SOC detection workflow. IOC extraction is treated as an upstream input that may originate from manual analysis, automated tools, or a combination of both; the protocol does not attempt to generate complete SIEM rules. Instead, it provides a systematic procedure for converting IOC strings into regex patterns that are syntactically valid, semantically interpretable, and suitable for operational deployment. The current IOC scope is deliberate: file paths, registry keys, and command-line indicators contain both stable and variable structural components that benefit from regex generalization, whereas atomic indicators such as IP addresses, domains, and hashes are more naturally operationalized through exact-match conditions or reputation-style lookups and therefore fall outside the primary scope. Within these boundaries, the protocol is intended to be portable across SOC environments that share comparable input formats and tooling preconditions.